OF SECTS AND HOUSES
'Now the days of happiness are over. I wish we could go back, we used to be happy. Do you remember when you were here?' said Umm Samir, who adopted me as her anthropological 'daughter' during my fieldwork in Syria, on the phone on July 2012. Despite her hard life, her ten children and fifteen grandchildren, I had never before heard Umm Samir's voice cracking with pain, heavy with sadness. 1 Her two youngest sons in the military, her country bathed in blood: 'Jaramana sends its sons to the army and receives back their coffins,' said my other Syrian 'mother,' Najwa. The coming year would be worse for Syria as for both their families, bayt Abud-Haddad and bayt Ouward, respectively. Umm Samir's son was abducted for 51 days by armed militia, Najwa's husband was arrested for four days by the police, both families count relative deaths from the conflict. Jaramana, the Druze suburb of Damascus, where they live, has become a refugee camp hosting some of the estimated total of 4 million internally displaced, a battleground between government and opposition forces, and as friends inform me, a large real estate construction site. All these are the ingredients that form the political economy of war, an economy that crudely and profitably trades in regional and international markets the human loss, displacement, weapons, as well as the economic or para-economic development. And this is despite the fact that Jaramana is not nearly as badly affected as some other areas around Damascus, in Aleppo, Homs or Raqqa.
The shifting contours of international friendships and enmities are transforming the resolution of the Syrian war from a near-impossibility to a second Somalia. The 'axes of evil' have reincarnated and reformed into sectarian battles of religious fundamentalism mixed with freedom, democracy, and human rights. These concepts are not contradictory terms: neither (2000: 3) . Similarly, Mahmood (2012) traces the association of religious minorities to human rights discourses early in the Ottoman Empire as a European strategy of fragmenting and contesting Ottoman authorities through the construction of Christian religious protectorates within its borders, while Neep (2012) describes the crystallisation of sectarian identifications during the French Mandate in Syria. Outside of Middle Eastern geographies, Appadurai (2006) shows how the macabre poetics and politics of majorities versus minorities are not the civilisational fossils of bygone eras but the intimately spelt, structural foundations of the modern phenomenon of the nation-state. Following such line of enquiry, this paper, concerned with the Druze community in Jaramana, Syria, takes sectarianism (ta'ifiyya), as both a dangerous reality as well as a historically and socially constructed phenomenon.
Where minorities in Syria are violently lacerated and distributed as war trophies, it is important to question the homogeneity and historicity of such formations. In this direction, the first aim of this paper is to demonstrate that the Druze of Jaramana are not homogenous in their beliefs and actions, and that they have never in fact been. politically and spatially, is a religious sect that emerged during the Fatimid Dynasty in 11 th Century Cairo, and whose contemporary communities primarily reside in Lebanon, Syria, Palestine and Jordan.3 Druze religion, based on the doctrine of tawhid which advocates strict and esoteric monotheism (Makarem 1979) , shares a historical relationship with Islam, especially the Ismaili branch of Shi'a Islam from which it emerged, and it incorporates strands of Sufi, neo-Platonic, Persian, and Hindu thought (Betts 1988) . A distinctive characteristic of the faith is its non-proselytism: Druze are born Druze, they cannot 'become' Druze (Khuri 2004) . This is theologically reinforced through a belief in human-to-human reincarnation (taqamous), in which Druze souls only inhabit Druze bodies (Makarem 1979) .
Moreover, endogamy is strictly practiced and prescribes that all members of the religious community, irrespectively of gender, be married exclusively within the Druze community.
When a member marries 'out' they, and possibly their family, become ostracised from the community (Alamuddin & Starr 1980; Layish 1982) .
The paper explores the histories, politics and houses of two Druze families that live in Jaramana but occupy different positions and networks. Bayt Abud-Haddad is considered ahl al-Jaramana (natives); it is one of the oldest and religiously significant families of Jaramana, a family that has been providing religious shaykhs and 'uqqal (religious initiates). The family lives in a traditional Arabic courtyard house, the male adults work in manual occupations.
None but one of the family's ten offsprings have gone to university. On the contrary, the family of bayt Ouward, who are relative newcomers to Jaramana and live in a modern apartment, all have university degrees, they are secular and socialise in political, intellectual circles they are considered mouthaqafin (intellectuals). While their houses are less than a five-minutes walk, their social cycles, networks but also perceptions and practices are 3 The Druze population is estimated to be 420,000 in Syria, 390,000 in Lebanon, 75, 000 in Palestine, 15, 000 in Jordan and 80,000 outside the Middle East (Makarem 2007 The second aim of this paper is an analytical concern with bayt, meaning house, household, and family in Arabic. The Arabic term bayt combines diverse meanings and social variations for the built material house, kinship terminology of family, minimal and also maximal lineage (Chatty 1974: 101 architecture tell us about people and how social organisation affects the material forms of their houses? In order to explore these questions I take the house as a living dynamic process (Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995; Kapytoff 1986; Waterson 1990 ), rather than a structuralist model of social organisation (Lévi-Strauss 1982; 1987) . However, I do not wish to relegate architecture into a mere function of ideology, a communicator of external, stable signifiers, but to trace the house itself as a relationship (Bourdieu 2005 (Bourdieu [1990 ; Mitchell 1990: 50) .
Besides, from Engels (2007 Engels ( [1882 ) to Miller (2005) , it has been demonstrated that people, environment and things are dialectically related and mutually constructed. However, as (2007: 756) points out, the anthropological study of the 'house' has often rigidly distinguished between the house as a form of architecture with its symbolic significance in the cosmos, and the house as a social category for cultural systems relating to kinship.
Instead, Vellonga argues, the house must be studied as both architecture and social organisation, specifically how 'architectural processes relate to social and symbolic ones, to see how the construction of materiality of the house as a work of architecture relates to the construction of social groups (whether identified as 'Houses' or not) and vice versa ' (2007: 760) . This paper analyses the material structure of the built house side-by-side with the genealogical memories and kinship organisation: the design, stories, conflicts, the social, political and economic transformations in the country and in the families are traced. I show how bayt, in Syria, as in the wider region (see Bahloul 1996; Delaney 1991; Geertz et al 1979; Oppenheimer 1980) , is practically inseparable from its material and immaterial aspects of belonging, and is an important local idiom which structures relationships and their political contestations (cf. Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Pine 1996; Gonzales-Ruibal 2006; Yeoh 2006; Tamari 1981 ).
However, in order to underscore the materiality of social organisation and family relations, and to show how these relate to material changes in the house and the political economy of Syria over the past decades, the paper is divided into three historical sections: pasts, presents and futures. In the first section, I outline the social, political and economic changes that took place in Syria since the beginning of the 20 th century, with particular emphasis on Jaramana and the Druze bayt of Abud-Haddad, showing how houses change according to broad social and economic transformations, but that the ways they change, are neither uniform nor politically uncontested. In 'presents' I provide a view of Jaramana from the ethnographic present of my fieldwork: neoliberal development, gentrification, and the conflicts within the middle class bayt of Ouward as these become apparent through memories of the house and family dwelling and narrated in specific rooms. Following Telle (2007: 196) , I hope that this biographical approach brings out vividly the multiple relations between peoples and things, time and space. In this way, I built on the connection between materiality and historicality, defined as the 'past of objects and persons' (Hirsch and Stewart 2005: 262) , the 'on-going social production of accounts of pasts and futures' (Ibid.) through a composite account of the (Khalaf 1981; Khoury 1991; Van Dam 1996; Perthes 2001) . Our houses in Jaramana are emplaced within this context of historical changes, and this section aims to outline the particular configurations, underlying that spaces and houses embody social, political and economic relations of production and reproduction.
The rise of Arab nationalism(s), the unstable political climate, and the growing economic inequalities defined the years between independence and the rise of the Ba'th Party to power (1946) (1947) (1948) (1949) (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) (1954) (1955) (1956) (1957) (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) , and favoured the foundation of the Arab Resurrection (Ba'th) Party in (Galvani 1974: 5; Kaylani 1972) . Combining socialism with ideals of Arab nationalism and pan-Arab unity (as in its slogan waḥda, ḥurriya, ishtirakiya: unity, freedom, socialism), the party was populist rather than strictly ideological (Hinnebusch 1990 (Hinnebusch , 1991 , with support from the army, minorities and a strong rural base (see Batatu 1999; Khoury 1991; Hinnebusch 1991 (Galvani 1974: 8) . Between 1966 Between -1970 , known as the Neo-Ba'th, the new leadership, although politically organised on a narrow basis, was able to implement radical socialist policies, such as nationalisation of resources and radical agrarian reform. It was also able to build up wider mobilization through munazzamat sha'biya (popular organizations) (Khalaf 1981: 168; Galvani 1974: 10-12) , such as the General Federation of Peasants and the General Federation of Labour Unions.
The radical policies of the Neo-Ba'th and the Arab defeat of 1967 had a direct effect on the regime, as it was losing popular legitimisation and support. The political, economic and social problems were epitomized by Hafez Al-Assad's seizure of power on the 13 th November 1970, in al-ḥaraka al-taḥḥīḥiya (the corrective movement). Seeking to re-establish regime authority by gaining broader social support, Assad's policy, from the 1970s until his death in 2000, sought to deal with the two-fold problems of (a) regional and international foreign relations since 1967 (Hinnebusch 1996; Perthes 2001; Seale 2000) and (b) economic policies such as al-infitāḥ 'ala al-sha'ab (opening to the people) and al-infirāj (relaxation and/or politico-economic liberalization) (Khalaf 1981: 181) . The nationalist foreign policy and the development of state capitalism helped strike a precarious balance between the regime, the private sector and the changing dynamics of the region and world (Haddad 2012; Rabo 2005 ).
Agrarian change, industrial development and urbanisation Syria was radically transforming since the 1970s, in terms of social structure of its agrarian and nomadic communities (Chatty 1984) , its industrial development (Rabo 2005) , and the drift of population from rural to urban centres in search of waged labour. In its struggle for legitimation and power consolidation, the Ba'th regime implemented land reform and redistribution (Hinnebusch 1991:37) which greatly affected the rural social and economic structures (Khalaf 1981 (Khalaf , 1991 . Through these policies, the Ba'th party was able to mobilize nationalist-populist ideologies in its recruitment of 'rural intelligentsia' (Hinnebusch 1991: 32) , and to provide the basis of popular/mass support from rural peasantry. The demolition of latifundist capitalism (Hinnebusch 1991: 37) resulted in the political and economic disempowerment of the historically elite group in Syria: the urban 'notables', while allowing previously disenfranchised groups, such as rural peasantry and minorities, to ascend to power (Khoury 1991: 27 from the 'old order' (Khalaf 1981: 45) which is normally associated with such terms' (Khalaf 1981: 563) . Through the appropriation politically are the peasants of the mountain, notably the montane Alawis and the Druze' (Batatu 1999: 12) .
Informants in Jaramana support the view of the Council (2000) regarding Jaramana's ancient past (Jaramana, they argue, in Aramaic means 'brave men'). However, based on family genealogies and oral histories collected during fieldwork, most of Jaramana's inhabitants inhabited the village at the turn of the 19 th century, while some of the oldest families in Jaramana, those considered ahl al-Jaramana (natives of Jaramana, such as bayt AbudHaddad) can trace their genealogies and residence in Jaramana up to 200 years ago. Land distribution and ownership in Jaramana is predominantly Druze, which explains the relative wealth of the Druze population vis-a-vis their neighbours or newcomers.
Before the current war, it was estimated that half of Jaramana's residents were Iraqi refugees (UNRWA 2010). While there was overwhelming Iraqi presence in certain parts of Jaramana, evidence of geographic and social segregation were obvious, for example the historical centre is almost exclusively inhabited by the Druze community (as mapped in figure 1 ). Both bayt
Ouward and bayt Abud-Haddad live within the vicinity of the historical centre of Jaramana.
Due to the high proportion of Druze land ownership in Jaramana and the development of real estate opportunities, the community in Jaramana have largely benefited from the economic policies of Hafez Al-Asssad. The neoliberal policies of Bashar Al-Assad did not affect the wealth accumulation of this community which was fostered during the same time from increased housing demand from Iraqi immigrants. Together with the changes in economic relations of production, the shift from agriculture to industry to services, and the rise in population, Jaramana at the time of fieldwork had already transformed from a village to one of the capital's bustling suburbs. The material and functional aspects of houses had similarly shifted from village houses (a rectangular formation of two or more adjacent rooms with an open courtyard) to tall contemporary apartment buildings. And yet, patterns of the social structure and social existence of the house, such as verilocal residence and the functionality of rooms, had been adapted rather than completely transformed: whole apartment blocks were owned by a single family that would likely accommodate verilocal marriage patterns within the same building.
Similarly, while construction materials had changed, many of the social idioms, forms and functions of the house remained. Specifically, hospitality and the reception of guests, continued to be practices of daily activity holding significant social, political and economic value, important ways of relating and belonging (see Sweet 1974 ; for a historical account see Makdisi 2000: 43-44) . The architecture of houses embodies this relational social practice in a way that, as Piot observes for Kabre houses: it is not the 'real' practices that derive from an 'ideal' model but rather the 'ideal' which derives from reality (1999: 127) . In this way, the guesthouse ( madafa, qa'a or mijlis) is the biggest room, or even a separate house where:
'under its arches coffee beans were roasted and pounded, clients earned and symbolic capital accumulated' (Khalaf 1981: 128) . The formal guesthouse of bayt Abud-Haddad is shown on figure 2. Druze, and generally Syrian houses today, continue to maintain this form, as Khuri (2004: 142) notes that 'in Jabal al-'Arab today, the first room to be built and furnished in a new house is the madafa, and the primary supplies are coffee and coffee pots.' In the modern apartments of Jaramana, most rooms are not functionally distinct (cf. Mitchell 1991; Weber The definition of spatial boundaries varies historically and depends on the perceived social proximity or closeness of interpersonal relations (Eickelman 1977; Rugh1997; Weber 2009 ).
One aspect of the construction, continuity and change of spatial boundaries is concerned with the gendered spaces of the Arab house (cf. Weber 2009: 232) . Associated with the feminine, the cold and the separable, bayt al-sheta (lit. house of the winter, figure 3 ) was where the gendered activities of food preparation, cooking, family eating, socialising, and birth took place, as well as where the women and children slept. This 'heart of the hearth' that was the warmest part of the house, the 'house of winter' can both literally as well as figuratively be conceptualised as a 'house' on its own, as in its name, a stand-alone entity. Today, while bayt al-sheta has been replaced by modern kitchens and appliances, bur the activities associated with it, i.e. the gendered division of labour have been maintained especially in bayt AbudHaddad where none of its female members works outside of their house. architecturally (from a village to a traditional Damascene house), economically (from lower economic status to relative wealth) and socially (from ordinary peasants to religious prominence) the house changes completely, along with the atypical matriarch, Nadira, who spearheads this change, and to whose story we turn next.
Bayt Abud-Haddad: Material houses and the materiality of social relations
Her portrait, lively eyes and plum cheeks framed by a white foutah, still dominated the formal reception room (qa'a) of the house, more than a decade after her death at the time of my stay at bayt Abud-Haddad. Nadira Latif was Ali's mother (Ali is the current head of the household, better known as Abu Samir, father of Samir). Nadira was the second wife of Hussein Haddad (see kinship diagram on figure 4). Hussein had one son and four daughters from his first marriage, and when his first wife died he remarried Nadira, who bore him a son and a daughter. Hussein died five years later, and Nadira, who never married again, looked after her children and Hussein's four daughters. Hussein's eldest, Hassan, however wanted to take as his own all of his father's inheritance. In Jaramana at the time, legal codes followed spatial proximity rather than religious doctrine. This meant that at instances of personal status, such as marriage or inheritance, the Druze inhabitants of Jaramana followed Sharia Nadira's story of determination and struggle for justice, as a woman who challenged and won over a man during patriarchical times through Druze religion, has become as important as a foundational myth for bayt Abud-Haddad, whose members continue to talk, praise and reinvent her. Here, I use 'foundational' intentionally to underline a structural change in the architecture of the house that was affected by Nadira: over the past century Abud-Haddad's house has gone through three distinct architectural phases (see figure 5) , the last two of which were instigated and supervised by Nadira, and perhaps embody much of the shifting and atypical organisation of the household. Talking of her entrance into bayt Abud-Haddad, Umm Samir, who was also orphan by mother and married Abu Samir from love in 1974, used to exalt the qualities of the Arabic house, that with its numerous self-contained rooms surrounding an internal courtyard, provided adequate facilities for the accommodation of more than one nuclear family: 'Arabic houses were not made for just one family. But now, everyone wants to live in their own apartment…' Yet, only The decision to build a traditional Damascene house has had profound effects on the ways that the family is perceived internally in Jaramana, specifically in terms of reputation and status. Firstly, the decision to go back, as it was, into something 'traditional' went against the prevailing strife at the time to be 'modern' associated with the emerging middle classes and the nouveau riches (Watenpaugh 2006; Salamandra 2004 ). This decision underscores the family's strategy not only to be ahl-al-Jaramana, but to show it by inscribing its origin (asil) on the new-built traditional walls of the house.
Secondly, this decision lays a concrete claim in changing status -from landless peasants (Hussein was an agricultural worker) to materially becoming part of the traditional elite landscape. This claim to a higher status, crucially, was subtly made not by way of buying one's way up, or by adopting the latest trend, or through conspicuous consumption -the tools accessible to middle classes or new elites (Salamandra 2004) , but rather by going back and embodying the hindsight 'traditional' values of household, through the adoption of a traditional urban rather than rural or peasant design for the house. This decision offers historical force to the aesthetics of the house that state that we have always been here (claiming tradition and authenticity), but we have never been poor (claiming a higher status).
It also underscores another incident of Nadira's strategic use of identities: while she had used In this gradual development of bayt Abud-Haddad's status and reputation, the material structure of the house helped greatly: not only as a visual symbol, but mainly because the house, with its nice rooms and spacious courtyard lent itself to wedding celebrations and funeral rites, ceremonials that necessitate large number of visitors, not only for the family but for much of the surrounding neighbourhood. By the time I was conducting fieldwork, the house had become a representation for the 'traditional Druze Jaramana', where large gatherings, shaykhly meetings and celebrations of expatriates, took place. In this way, the family, like the house, became indisputably part of the traditional, religious and social elites of Jaramana.
On a final level, building a traditional house of indistinct sectarian denomination may be understood as a subtle critique of modernisation and industrialisation, a strategy shared with the old disenfranchised elites that developed a politics of resistance through claims to authenticity of an old Damascus (Salamandra 2004 ). Yet, at the same time, bayt AbudHaddad provides a critical foil to these old 'notable' Damascene elites that demand the historical monopoly over authenticity, status, and taste (also see Salamandra 2004; Shannon 2006) , as their claim to a historical transcendental belonging to a traditional elite has been affected by the Ba'th policies of land redistribution through which Nadira and Abu Samir were able to own agricultural land. The emerging visibility and distinction of the Druze community related to a new kind of confidence, then, steaming from elite investment in the area in the context of neo-liberal state reforms, middle class consumption combined with 'identity' politics, and the country's long term stability. All these flows of people, capital, even of the illusions of national prosperity (about 30% of the total population was living in poverty, Hinnebusch 2013) partook in a process of redefining communal groups and boundaries, and sustaining the re-imagination of the Druze community as a publicly distinguishable entity. Thus, while the Druze, especially those in close proximity to Muslim-majority cities, had historically refrained from publicly displaying religious affiliation as a way of protection and dissimilation (taqiyya, see Makarem 1979) , the community now were publicly displaying its religion in a way that made it more Druze than ever before. This public display of sectarian identification served to mask to some extent the economic, social and political differences that stratified the Druze community internally, along broader class divisions (cf. Batatu 1999; Haddad 2012; Hinnebusch 1990) , that cross-cut Syria's religions, ethnicities and regions. Because most of the Jaramana Druze own some property and many diversify their income from both labour Farid Ouward is married to his matrilineal cousin (see kinship diagram on figure 9), Najwa, and they have four children: Zahra, Hiba, Nidal and Karem. Najwa's parents, migrated to Suwayda, capital of the Druze province in Jabal al-'Arab, from Lebanon at the beginning of the 20th Century. Najwa's father, now in his 90s, lives in his grand European-styled mansion in Suwayda, and proudly recalls the days he was a General in Sultan Pasha Al-Atrash's army during the Syrian Independence Revolution (1925) (1926) (1927) against the French Mandate forces.
PRESENTS: MIDDLE CLASS, POLITICS, AND A FAMILY CONFLICT
Najwa grew up with her five sisters and three brothers in Suwayda, and moved to Jaramana after her marriage with Farid Ouward.
Figure 9: Kinship diagram of Bayt Ouward
Najwa received primary education in Suwayda and passed into the Mathematics Department of Damascus University. Her family, however, vetoed her movement to Damascus, and instead she enrolled in a local institute to acquire teaching qualifications. Najwa explained, as we were looking through old black and white photographs -photographs of young Najwa with long hair and short skirts -that becoming a teacher was a much more accepted 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 When Najwa married Farid, they moved into his house in Jaramana. Najwa enrolled in the University of Damascus and graduated after the birth of their first daughter, Zahra. She worked as a schoolteacher in Jaramana and so did Farid, but in the rural provinces of Syria;
he believes that his postings to relatively secluded rural places were not coincidental, but a means of punishing his political dissent. During the early 1980s, a time of political turmoil in Syria, Farid was made to 'voluntarily' retire from his teaching job, due to his political involvement. It was during this time that Najwa, Farid, and his sisters, decided to start a family business and convert their house from a single storey courtyard house into a modern three-floor apartment building.
In 1985, Farid endured a life-threatening stroke, in the course of which he suffered internal brain haemorrhage. He underwent a successful operation and six months of hospitalisation.
Farid received a medical certification of 'brain damage.' With this certificate, the state authorities and secret services cannot arrest him, or so Farid claimed, on the basis of his 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The house has a large living room decorated with baroque-style sofas and armchairs in royal blue, containing Damascene in-laid mother-of-pearl wooden tables, and impressive paintings.
Zahra, Najwa and I, were sitting in the living room with the air-conditioning on, sipping
Arabic coffee in July 2009, when a different geography of the house and the family emerged in conversation. I recount that geography here, because, although 'immaterial' it permeates the materiality of the house both its rooms and its social organisation.
Najwa had a miscarriage prior to the birth of Zahra, and when her daughter arrived everyone in the family rejoiced upon the news of the healthy baby. 'The family -well, my auntie
Yousra to be precise -were less happy for the birth of my sister, Hiba,' said Zahra in a humorous tone. 'When Hiba was born I was almost four years old, and my mother returned from the hospital with Hiba and a doll for me. She said that my sister had brought this gift, and for many years I believed that Hiba had been in the belly of our mother with the doll!'
Her humour alongside the recollections from childhood that she and her mother were recreating, were intended to alleviate the tensions of Zahra's imminent departure. Zahra had been living in Europe for many years, completing a doctorate. Her younger sister, Hiba, had joined Zahra, for higher education. Emigration is very common in Syria: to the Gulf, Europe, America, legally and illegally, for work and studies. Yet, it is quite uncommon for females to pursue higher studies outside Syria. Although Umm Nidal helped her daughters to get into higher education and to travel outside of Syria, she was increasingly concerned about their marriage prospects: 'for an over-qualified woman it is difficult to find an equal husband in our society… and the more they [her daughters] grow older the more difficult it becomes.' Umm Nidal's daughters were not visiting Syria often: more than a year had passed since Zahra's previous visit. Now, Zahra had been in Syria for a week and she was due to leave in an hour.
'Yousra was happier when Nidal arrived… But I couldn't understand how my mother became
Umm Nidal from Umm Zahra!' Keeping with Arabic traditions, the Druze follow the prevalent Arabic cultural patterns in naming: the parents take the name of their first-born son, and in his absence, the first born-daughter. Nidal was in his mid-twenties, and also had a Damascus University degree. Umm Nidal had been trying to find him a bride during my stay there, that is a bride other than the girl that Nidal was in love with. That girl was deemed by Umm Nidal as 'uneducated' and not equal to him. Thus, although Nidal had remained in Syria, his marriage preferences also caused tensions within the family.
On the day of her departure, Zahra's caustic humour was focused on Yousra, Farid's elder sister. The two women had a verbal disagreement the day before, and Yousra decided to go for an excursion so she would not be present at the time of Zahra's departure. Many pressures surrounded Zahra's presence in the house: when and whether she will return, who is to blame for Zahra's departure. In recreating pleasant common memories with her mother, Zahra was not only evoking the ties that bind a mother-daughter relation, but was painting a picture of Yousra, as a common, to her and Najwa, enemy. Zahra was remaking the story of childhood from her current point of view, in an attempt to reinforce the relationship with her mother.
As the story continued, Zahra narrated how she used to play in the neighbourhood always beyond her curfew, Najwa adding that Zahra used to be galizah (undisciplined). Najwa would punish her by grounding her, but Zahra would continue to disobey. I remember Najwa nodding her head in agreement, and looking at me during the story. I wondered whether this was to make sure that I understand or because she was avoiding looking at her daughter whose departure was daunting and painful. Maybe she also knew that the memories of childhood narrated were not so innocent, as they contained present implications, tensions and disagreements. Family relations were strained, although at that point, still brewing beneath the surface. Umm Nidal was concerned about her two daughters living in Europe: will they return, will they marry a Druze, is it her fault for letting them go? Abu Nidal was more concerned about philosophical and political matters than domestic politics. Nidal did not approve of his sisters' life outside of Syria and outside of the Druze realm of endogamy. He understood their reasons, but he argued somewhat cynically 'these are our traditions, this is our society, we cannot change them.' Only Karem, the youngest offspring of the family, supported his sisters. Being the youngest saved him the social pressure of marriage. At the time of the above conversation, and for some years prior to it, Najwa had been putting up with local rumours, and their social implications, that her daughters were apostates. During and after this conversation, Najwa was increasingly critical of Farid's liberalism, and was turning to religion and tradition for solace. 4 This is how Najwa, perhaps feeling responsible for her daughter's liberal upbringing, described herself jokingly:
'There was a man fishing on the shore and he falls in the sea. He cannot swim and cries out for help. Passersby gather at the shore and they all stand watching the drowning man, too afraid to jump in and save him. Somehow, another man is accidentally pushed into the water. He can swim so rescues the angler, while the hoard of onlookers applaud his brave heroic act as he comes out of the sea. And he replies: This paper has explored two interrelated themes: the Druze community of Jaramana as a heterogeneous historical entity; and the architecture of bayt as both a social unit, an idiom for relations and a material entity. Through the renditions of pasts and presents, the paper demonstrated how houses are part of the wider social context and economic transformations in contemporary Syria. Moreover, through the juxtaposition of the two bayts, it explored architecture as the embodiment of ideals and of practices, but also of ideals and practices that are not equally shared in the Druze sect or within a Druze family, revealing differences in taste, status, class and generation. The concept of bayt challenges the analytical distinction between the house and its inhabitants, emphasising the relational and material connection between social content and physical form. Through the architectural development of the house of Abud-Haddad, and through the shifting contours of a family conflict in the narrative construction of a common house and memory in bayt Ouward, it shows how the materiality of the house changes along with changes in the social entity that dwells in it. In this direction, the paper underlined that a relational approach needs to be combined with a historical understanding of change, through architecture here. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 
